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Abstract This article addresses the art of living in a technological culture as the active
engagement with technomoral change. It argues that this engagement does not just take the
form of overt deliberation. It shows in more modest ways as reflection-in-action, an
experimental process in which new technology is fitted into existing practices. In this
process challenged values are re-articulated in pragmatic solutions to the problem of
working with new technology. This art of working with technology is also modest in the
sense that it is not oriented to shaping one’s own subjectivity in relation to technology. It
emanates from human existence as relational and aims at securing good relationships. The
argument will be developed in relation to a case study of the ways in which homecare
workers engaged with the value of privacy, challenged by tele-monitoring technology that
was newly introduced into their work.
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This essay investigates the art of living in a technological culture as the engagement with
‘‘technomoral change’’ (Swierstra 2013, p. 200). This engagement, I argue, does not just
take place as overt deliberation on challenged values and the desirability of technologies. It
shows in more modest ways in an everyday experimental tinkering to ‘‘fit’’ (Pols 2012,
p. 25) new technology into practices. In this process challenged values are re-articulated in
pragmatic solutions to ethical problems that surface in working with specific technologies.
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This modest ethical work can be seen as ‘‘reflection-in-action’’ (Scho¨n 1983, p. 49), part of
the ‘‘art’’ (p. 18) professionals bring to bear on indeterminate situations. This art of
working with technology is also modest in the sense that it is not oriented to shaping one’s
own subjectivity in relation to technology. It emanates from our existence as relational
beings and is directed to securing good relationships. I develop my argument in relation to
a case study of the ways in which caregivers in Dutch homecare engaged with the value of
privacy, challenged by tele-monitoring technology for frail elderly people that was newly
introduced into their work. Before I introduce the case and discuss its main characteristics
as a process of reflection-in-action and as a relational activity, I will sketch the dynamics of
technology and morality in a more general theoretical perspective.
1 The Interplay of Technology and Morality
Though the social role of technology in changing how we live, work and communicate is
widely acknowledged, attention to the ways in which technology specifically influences
our morality is more recent (cf. Swierstra 2013; Verbeek 2011). Here I am interested in
how new technologies can destabilize established moral values and lead to ‘‘technomoral
change’’ (Swierstra 2013, p. 200). Building on a pragmatic view of morality, which I will
follow, Swierstra sustains that acting morally in everyday life is largely a matter of
practical routines. New technologies can break these routines and bring tacit values to
awareness, which can lead to their (re)articulation and modification.
The relationship between technology and morality is not unidirectional. Obviously,
values influence the development of new technologies. Moreover, technology users do not
simply adjust their values to new technological possibilities that open up. What people
believe in is bound up with their identity and the culture shared with others. Therefore, new
options for perceiving the environment or for acting in it, offered by technology, can lead
to moral conflict when technology pushes in one direction and established values in
another. Pols (2012) demonstrates how much work healthcare professionals and clients
invest to ‘‘fit’’ (p. 25) new technologies into daily care practices. Dealing with moral
conflict and change is one aspect of fitting together technological applications, healthcare
clients and care activities—new and existing ones.
Acknowledging that technology co-shapes morality thus does not exclude all belief in
human agency—a necessary requirement to see people as moral beings in the first place.
The question is what this agency looks like. Verbeek (2011) emphasizes the capability of
people to develop a relationship to the technologies that influence them. Following Fou-
cault, he speaks about this as a ‘‘self-practice’’ (p. 75), in which technology users ‘‘design’’
or ‘‘style’’ their subjectivity in interaction with technology. Swierstra (2013) calls for an
active welcoming of opportunities for ‘‘moral innovation’’ (p. 215) and reflective
engagement with technomoral change. In this essay I investigate a case of this kind of
engagement. However, I will not follow Swierstra and Verbeek in their focus on overt
deliberation and argument.
Swierstra (2013) speaks of the process of reflection, instigated by the disruptive impact
of new technologies, as a process of stopping and thinking and discussing. He calls this
‘‘ethics’’ (p. 206) as opposed to a more tacit morality. However, in the same way as values
in ordinary life are articulated in particular decisions and acts, reflective re-articulations of
values can also take place within practice, in a process that Scho¨n (1983) has called
‘‘reflection-in-action’’ (p. 21). Like Pols (2012), who speaks about the ‘‘fitting’’ activity of
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technology users in terms of a practical ‘‘modest aesthetics’’ (p. 42), Scho¨n (1983) refers to
this process as ‘‘an irreducible element of art’’ in professional practice (p. 18).
How can we describe and conceptualize such an art of living, or working, with tech-
nology? I will trace one such process based on observations of how homecare workers
engaged with new tele-monitoring technology. I focus on the ethical work—or art—
caregivers displayed around one particular value challenged by the new technology: pri-
vacy, as it pertained to the lives of their clients. Borrowing the term from Pols (2012), I call
this art ‘‘modest’’ in the sense that it takes place, quietly as it were, within mundane
activity.
2 Tele-Monitoring and Privacy in Dutch Homecare
The tele-monitoring system discussed here employs motion sensors, placed in the homes of
frail elderly people to track daily patterns of sleeping, eating, toileting and general activity.
These patterns are scanned for acute or gradual changes in activity that could indicate
emerging problems with health and well-being. Because the system stores and compares
data, it can track gradual changes in activity not easily noticed by human eyes. The
information is made available to the co-ordinating caregivers for particular clients through
a password protected website. Significant changes are sent as SMS alerts to their cell-
phones. Activity monitoring offers caregivers information about their clients beyond direct
observations and talks during care visits. Homecare organizations introduce this technology
to improve the diagnosis of their clients’ health and actual ability for self-care. On this basis
they hope to support vulnerable elderly people to live at home longer.
My research took place between September 2010 and January 2013 and started when
activity monitoring technology was introduced with three homecare organizations in the
south of the Netherlands. I attended meetings in which caregivers were trained in using the
technology and follow up meetings in the 9 months afterwards in which teams of care-
givers discussed working with the system. I interviewed five caregivers more in depth
about their experiences, and spoke with managers and trainers of similar projects in the
Netherlands and Belgium.
The introduction of new technology, especially when this takes place top-down as in the
case observed, often starts with confusion. Normal routines are partly broken and the
implicated knowledge and values get challenged. At the instruction meetings I attended,
caregivers had many questions about how to fit the technology into their daily routines.
They were also specifically disturbed about the privacy issues that activity monitoring
raised for their clients and wondered openly whether the system was acceptable. To these
last remarks, trainers and managers responded that caregivers would come to see the
advantages of enhanced monitoring in working with the system, suggesting these advan-
tages weighed up to their concerns. However, this is not exactly what I observed in the
months that followed.
After the introductory meetings, caregivers started to experiment with the system.
Though many, often to their own surprise, indeed came to like working with it, concerns
for their clients’ privacy did not simply evaporate. Instead caregivers designed ways of
fitting the technology into the relationship with their clients that would respect their clients’
privacy. In this process, what privacy means in the new technologically mediated situation
was re-articulated.
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Discussing the current widespread public debate on privacy from the perspective of law-
and policymaking, Solove (2008) remarks how the word ‘‘privacy’’ is used with great
emotive force, while no one can state clearly what it means. This was not different in the
team meetings. Despite their worries, caregivers could not really name the ‘‘privacy
issues’’ involved. This is not strange when we consider, as Solove also suggests, that
privacy in everyday practice means a multiplicity of things. It refers to bodies, homes and
personal space, but also to public expressions about persons and to reputation. Privacy is at
stake with the disclosure of data about people, such as information about sexual habits,
income or shopping behavior, but also with specific uses of these data. Moreover, under the
pressure of new information technologies that enable capturing and mining data on an
unprecedented scale, the meaning of privacy is changing. New user practices on social
media, in which people voluntarily publish vast amounts of personal data, also suggest that
notions of privacy are in flux.
Next to the cultural disarray around privacy, two additional reasons explain why
caregivers experienced difficulties articulating privacy issues they feared were at stake.
Firstly, at this point it was still unclear what monitoring technology would actually mean in
their daily work, except that it seemed to invite them to check on their clients’ behavior in
ways that made them uncomfortable. Secondly, values normally do not exist as indepen-
dent entities. They are articulated in specific acts and rarely in exactly the same way. To
define a value unambiguously for all cases in which it appears at stake is difficult. Solove
proposes to investigate the multiple meanings of privacy based on Wittgenstein’s notion of
concepts as a family tied together by various resemblances. This probably suits not just for
privacy, but most other values too.
However, in working with the technology, I would suggest, caregivers did articulate
what privacy means. Mapping their activity, six more or less distinct meanings of privacy
emerged.
2.1 Privacy as Personal Dignity
Proper care is premised on the detection of vulnerabilities. However, clients do not always
mention problems they face. They do not want to be a burden or are ashamed, specifically
about problems with basic bodily functions. Caregivers discovered how monitoring tech-
nology could help to relieve their clients from having to openly mention shameful problems
and ask for help. Because caregivers could observe irregular patterns of sleeping, eating or
toileting, they could initiate discussion on problems with diarrhea, with pain or anxiety in the
night, or with managing meals. The system, they found, at least partly also supported clients’
privacy by speaking for them about undignified vulnerabilities.
2.2 Privacy as Psychic Space
Clients give permission to install the system, but tend to forget the presence of the sensors
after a while. When caregivers received data, they had to decide whether and how to
communicate these to clients. However, alerts or data did not always prove meaningful.
The sensors could indicate declining meal preparation, while caregivers knew their client
was eating out. Alerts on nighttime activity could signal pain, disturbed sugar levels or
beginning dementia, but sometimes being a nighthawk simply belonged to a person.
Caregivers found they needed to interpret data with their client in mind. They opted to
ignore data they deemed meaningless and would not mention these to clients. To remind
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clients of ‘‘being watched’’ when it made no difference in the care for them, they dis-
covered, burdened clients and made them ‘‘feel watched’’ unnecessarily.
2.3 Privacy as Personal Perspective
Caregivers were sometimes confronted with situations where the technology indicated
something different than what clients communicated. Clients would minimize troubles or
conversely, complain about a bad sleep, while the system suggested the opposite. When
problems didn’t seem serious, caregivers found they ‘‘shouldn’t press on’’. Clients, they
pointed out, are entitled to their own views and their own motives for what they tell
caregivers. As one caregiver put it, ‘‘She doesn’t have to let me in on everything.’’
Caregivers also learned that discrepancies could signal other needs than those phrased,
such as loneliness or anxiety. Instead of keeping distance to leave their clients’ personal
perspective in place, these cases needed extra attention to bring that perspective out.
2.4 Privacy as Control Over One’s Life
Some observations did need inquiries. Here, the solutions caregivers developed differed
strongly. Those who were very uncomfortable with this task resorted to asking family or
colleagues what they felt was going on. Others carefully explained their observations to
clients, offering them room to formulate their views on how to meet needs. As one
caregiver explained, clients need control over their care. Respecting privacy, another said,
entails that ‘‘I make transparent what I see and share vulnerability and decision making’’.
Interestingly, she thereby indicated that caregivers have to give up some of their ‘‘privacy’’
by offering their observations up to scrutiny.
2.5 Privacy as a Gift of Trust
Many caregivers felt that monitoring brought them closer to their clients, because they
received a better picture of their clients’ personal rhythm of life, but also because their
clients knew they made these observations and trusted them with these. They felt grateful
to their clients for that.
2.6 Privacy as Based on Ways of (Not) Looking
Caregivers indicated discomfort with data that gave ‘‘too much’’ information on their
clients, particularly on the exact time and place of activities in the home. They ignored
these, unless pressed by emergencies. They suggested it was important to not look at more
than you need to know, or formulated differently, not to look for the sake of looking.
Caregivers explained in interviews that observations are and should be part of their pro-
fessional relationship with their client and not mere acts of curiosity.
In fitting activity monitoring technology into their daily practice, caregivers moved
from concern and confusion about their clients’ privacy to pragmatic solutions of privacy
problems. These solutions represent ethical work in re-articulating what privacy is, how it
matters and what could be fitting norms to respect it. This process was accompanied by
talk, in which caregivers referred to ‘‘privacy’’, ‘‘personal space’’, ‘‘feeling watched’’, or
more elusively to ‘‘Big Brother situations’’, but they didn’t discuss privacy as such. They
communicated experiences and solutions. Re-articulating privacy took place mostly in-
A Modest Art: Securing Privacy in Technologically Mediated…
123
action. I will now discuss some structural characteristics of this process, drawing on the
exploratory work of Scho¨n (1983) on reflection-in-action, supplemented by some sug-
gestions derived from Lyotard’s (1988, 1991) rethinking of Kant’s aesthetic reflection.1
3 The Art of Reflection-in-Action
Scho¨n (1983) defines the artistry of professionals against mistaken conceptions of pro-
fessionalism as the instrumental solving of standard problems, based on acquired spe-
cialized knowledge. He argues that practice is too unstable for such a ‘‘technological fix’’
(p. 15) and provides an alternative epistemology of practice in which reflection-in-action is
central. Reflection-in-action is the capability of professionals to engage with complex,
indeterminate situations that challenge their tacit knowledge and former experience within
their practice. These situations appear as ‘‘messes’’ (p. 18). A requirement for reflection-in-
action and a first structural moment of the process is openness to ‘‘messes’’, or, as Scho¨n
puts it more positively, to situations in their uniqueness. Being open is not being passive,
simply letting messes wash over one. It is an active attitude. Lyotard (1988) speaks about
‘‘passibility’’ (passibilite´) (pp. 121, 190), the capacity to suspend business as usual and put
established assumptions on hold in order to ‘‘receive’’ new possibilities.
In the case discussed, although management introduced the technology, working with it
started as a pilot case on a voluntary basis. Nevertheless, caregivers still had to take the
further step of actually committing themselves to engaging with the new technology and
with the ‘‘mess’’, in Scho¨n’s sense, it seemed to entail for their clients’ privacy. Some
caregivers drew back, not overtly, but by simply not using the technology. Others jumped
in, which takes courage and some confidence in one’s ability to find a way out.
Engaging with situations in their uniqueness does not give one much hold. As explained
earlier, even what the problem was, privacy in this case, could not be defined. Problems,
Scho¨n (1983) makes clear, have to be set. Yet, with existing assumptions challenged, this
can only be done by moving ahead. In this process, experimental ‘‘moves’’ tentatively
frame elements of the problem and suggest solutions, but these may need revision several
times. Scho¨n (1983) calls this a ‘‘reflective conversation’’ (p. 130) with the situation, in
which professionals try out something, while listening to the talk-back of the situation. It
entails a kind of double vision, keeping multiple possibilities open, and considering moves
preliminary, while a trajectory towards a solution gradually forms.
Caregivers started to work with technology that they felt entailed serious privacy
problems. In order to discover that the system did not just threaten their client’s privacy,
but could also protect their personal dignity, caregivers partly reframed the way they
intuitively saw the system at first. They stopped seeing it as only a tool for surveilling and
checking on clients and started seeing it as a device that could also speak for their clients.
Tacit ideas, that respecting someone’s privacy entails not observing them when they can’t
look back, were suspended while a new sense of protecting someone’s dignity formed. This
implied new obligations, such as becoming sensitive to data that could indicate shameful
vulnerabilities clients might hide and finding tactful ways of opening conversation about
these.
Another assumption caregivers had to let go was that data represent information to be
had and used. Sometimes data were irrelevant or they were ‘‘too much’’ and had to be




ignored. In the beginning, caregivers also often felt they had to be absolutely open to
clients about observations in order to be respectful. This didn’t work well. Clients
responded by getting disturbed and caregivers realized they needed to find ways of dealing
with observations that didn’t make clients ‘‘feel watched’’ in ways that hindered them.
Caregivers discovered that weighing what to watch or ignore, and what and how to
communicate, while keeping individual clients and the relationship with them as a rela-
tionship of trust in mind, had to be their responsibility.
Conversing with the situation, caregivers gradually circumscribed the place the tech-
nology could and should take in the relationship with their clients and their own place in
the new set-up. ‘‘The system should stand in the background’’ and ‘‘One shouldn’t insist on
one’s watching role’’ were formulations of this. Protecting clients’ privacy where tech-
nology threatened it implied that they had to develop ways of watching data and ways of
closing their eyes on them. All the while they did ethical work in re-articulating what
privacy is in multiple ways and how it is to be cherished in the new technologically
mediated situation. The framing of the many-sided problem of privacy happened while
experimenting with the technology and finding solutions.
Though willingness to suspend assumptions and openness to new possibilities are vital
to this process, not everything is in flux in reflection-in-action. Professionals draw on
values that remain standing and also on former experience that they extend creatively into
the new situation, ‘‘seeing’’ the last ‘‘as’’ a new example of their repertoire (Scho¨n 1983,
p. 139). Caregivers in the case study drew heavily on their experience with and sense for
good relationships. They remained committed to solve privacy problems in ways that
enabled their clients to flourish and that secured mutual trust.
In sum, reflection-in-action appears as a process in which openness to a situation in its
uniqueness and willingness to suspend assumptions lead to an experimental conversation
with the situation. In this process problems and solutions are articulated together by
making moves, choosing among different possibilities. Moves are subsequently either
abandoned or pursued further, while a trajectory to a solution forms. How can this process
be seen as artistic or aesthetic?
Lyotard (1991) makes a distinction between two aspects of aesthetic reflexivity as a
faculty of the mind that can help to clarify the nature of this process, a ‘‘heuristic’’ and a
‘‘tautegoric’’ one (p. 16). The first refers to the capacity to move beyond what one knows,
based on hunches of how or what things might be. Keeping multiple possibilities open,
trying out things in an as-if and what-if mode form the core of this imaginative capacity.
According to Lyotard (1991) the heuristic faculty functions in art in its most free or
‘‘naked’’ (p. 19) state. In science, as in professional life, creativity is constrained by
specific goals, such as providing good care, and by practices as they exist. While an artist
may strive to shake off all conventions to begin anew, professionals keep part of their
acquired ‘‘attire’’ in place and bring more of their former experience to bear on the new.
Pols’ term ‘‘modest’’ to distinguish a practical, professional aesthetics from the more
grandiose creativity and beauty of art seems quite suitable here. The difference is one of
degree and of context.
The second aspect of aesthetic reflexivity, tautegory, designates what orients creative
heuristic moves. It is the ability of the mind to receive impressions and to feel itself at the
same time in relationship to these, and to take this feeling as its guide. Lyotard compares it
to the proprioceptive sense of left and right that orients the human body in space. In its
basic state it is a feeling of pleasure or displeasure, of harmony between the mind and what
it senses, or of difference. Next to the creative nature of the process, what makes reflection-
in-action artistic or aesthetic is this orientation on feeling.
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While the improvisational nature of what caregivers did became clear above, the
tautegoric aspect of their activity can now be elucidated. Caregivers referred a lot to
feelings, their own, such as concern, resistance or feeling right about something, but also
their clients’ feeling of flourishing, being cared for, or of feeling psychically confined by
watching eyes. They received their clients’ trust with gratitude and a new sense of con-
nection. More importantly, they sounded out the proper place for the technological system
and their own position towards the data aesthetically. They indeed attempted, as Pols
(2012) argues, to bring about ‘‘fits’’ and avoid ‘‘misfits’’ (p. 43). Both fits and misfits are
sensed as a relationship in the world ‘‘between relevant variables’’ and tautegorically in the
relationship of caregivers to these, as feeling uncomfortable, hopeful or right about
something. What enabled working with the technology was finding proper balances
between, for instance, not seeing enough and seeing too much.
While a feeling for fits, balance or harmony resonates with the aesthetics of beauty,
looking for fits begins in a feeling closer to the sublime, the aesthetic fascination for
something incomprehensible that carries the mind beyond the familiar. In this experience,
disturbance about what appears as chaotic goes together with a feeling of commitment to
unknown possibilities. Commitment to the unknown returns during the process of reflec-
tion where professionals don’t remain within their comfort zone, but take risks in finding
new and as yet unimagined fits. Lastly, a ‘‘modest’’ experience of the sublime, as a feeling
for what does not fit with the mind but transcends it, either temporarily or more funda-
mentally, is vital to the whole process of reflection-in-action. It is an awareness of the
always tentative nature of human acts and knowledge. Openness asks courage and confi-
dence, but also entails humility.
4 Closing Remarks: An Art of Relating
Ethical engagement with technomoral change, instigated by new technologies, I hope to
have shown, does not just take place as overt deliberation and argument. It is also done
reflecting in-action, in the midst of daily practice. I have presented reflection-in-action as a
‘‘modest’’ artistic activity, proceeding creatively on the basis of tautegoric feeling, within a
given professional practice. The significance of processes like these goes beyond care and
professional practice more generally, and warrants closer investigation in various everyday
situations, as part of an art of living with technology.
Whether engaged with technomoral change, or other changes evoked by technology,
such an art is an ethical project in itself. Verbeek (2011) presents it as a self-practice, a
more or less conscious styling of one’s subjectivity in relationship to technology. I will
close my argument by proposing another, more ‘‘modest’’ alternative. Firstly, this art
originates in humans as relational beings, whose identity is formed in relationship to the
beings around them, whether human, animal or material ones—including technological
beings. Secondly, it is oriented towards establishing good relationships.
Caregivers reflecting on privacy problems in the relationship with their clients were not
aiming to style their own subjectivity and life as a work of art in relationship to new
technology. They were securing good relationships. This process was guided by caregivers
using their feeling and aesthetic sense, including moral intimations of what they felt was
right, but to see this as a project of and for a self does not do justice to it. I chose a specific
moral conflict as case here. While morality is relational par excellence, having to do with
what human beings owe each other and with visions of a good human life (Swierstra 2013),
the art caregivers displayed was also relational in a more general sense. The situation they
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found themselves in, together with their clients, was co-shaped by technology. As Verbeek
(2011) contends, humans and technologies co-constitute each other. Moreover, openness to
messes and trying to find a way out entails that one allows oneself, one’s knowledge and
values, to be changed by occurrences. Oriented by feeling and sounding out relationships
in the world, reflection-in-action is not the capacity of a self or subject, positioned towards
a world as object. It is an art of relating, belonging to relational beings, and oriented to
bringing about good relationships in the world of which one is part. Instead of implicitly
borrowing from theories that see art as the activity of individuals, or creating one’s life as a
work of genius, theorizing an art of living with technology could gain from a more
‘‘relational aesthetics’’ (cf. Bourriaud 1998) that sees artworks as events and sets of
relationships with the world, and their creators as operators within these.
Interestingly, a task such as the one Bourriaud assigns to contemporary art, to strengthen
conviviality and turn technologies from economic into life possibilities, places the activity
of caregivers discussed here at the forefront of an artistic project. Articulating the multiple
meanings of privacy in technologically mediated care, caregivers devised solutions that are
of value beyond the context of healthcare. They demonstrated that attitudes towards per-
sonal data, ways of looking at them and ignoring them, as well as a sense for data as a gift to
be cherished, are as important as setting material and legal limits to technological possi-
bilities. In this, they point to vital human relational capital in finding solutions to problems
that technologies introduce. This can be a significant contribution to moral innovation in the
age of extended data mining and social media, in which ways of (not) looking and of
‘‘valuing’’ data could be further developed as part of civil life. The art of living with
technology explicitly shows itself here as an art of living with technology together.
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